The example discussed in refs. 2, 3 is a fish that is assumed to be a successful automaton until pain consciousness is introduced through genetic mutation. This occurs during contact with a trauma producing element in the fish’s environment that I call an electric probe. Pain consciousness is always assumed to have a negative effect on probability amplitudes. As a result, probe contact behavior is repressed, which means that probe escape behavior is encouraged. An incorrect association (in which pain represses an escape from the probe) is certainly allowed by this mechanism, but it would threaten the survival of the species. Natural selection therefore supports an appropriate coupling between subjective states and physical states.

Although an automation might evolve in a satisfactory way all by itself (i.e., without the aid of consciousness), I assume that consciousness operating in tandem with biological automation will always speed the process of evolution (see last paragraph of ref. 3). In that case, consciousness will always be a benefit to the species.

Wonderfish

I extend the above development further in ref. 2, imagining that the next step in evolution produces a ‘wonderfish’ that not only experiences pain upon contact with the electric probe, but also becomes consciously aware of the approaching probe through a new found experience - visual consciousness. Wonderfish then associates this new experience with the pain of probe contact, and consequently, the creature learns a new emotion — fear consciousness. Fear constitutes a separate mind-to-matter influence on emerging probability amplitudes. As before, natural selection couples this subjective experience with an appropriate behavioral response.

The above wonderfish scenario has some flaws. In the first place, it is not necessary for wonderfish to become visually aware of the probe in order to learn to fear it from afar. Just as mammals experience a need to lick salt without being aware of the reason for that need, an automaton can learn to avoid an electric probe without having a conscious experience of the probe. The creature first needs to evolve the necessary parts for photon detection, such as eyes, optical nerves, etc. With that equipment, it can learn to experience ‘fear’ when its photon detectors behave in a certain way. And if this happens, then fear too can speed evolution by supporting escape behavior in response to a dangerous approach to the probe. Like pain, it too can make a separate evolutionary appearance as a result of inside observer activity — and without the benefit of visual consciousness.

We therefore have the possibility of a creature experiencing fear of an approaching electric probe, and separately, experiencing pain when it makes contact with the probe. Furthermore, it can do this without any conscious experience of the probe as an external object, or any conscious memory of either the pain or the fear experience, and without any conscious association between the two.  This independence of origin better explains why these two experiences are so qualitatively different.

Having reached such a plateau in evolution, the inside observer mechanism provides no rationale for filling in the gaps. Introducing pain consciousness is one evolutionary leap that is possible using this mechanism. Introducing fear in the manner described above is separate evolutionary leap using this mechanism. But filling in the gaps between the two requires five separate steps, none of which can be motivated by my hypothetical quantum mechanical mechanism, and one of which is the extraordinary step of learning to construct conscious visual images. Assuming that pain and fear consciousness are already in place, the five steps are:

Wonderfish Scenario
(1) evolve a visual image of the electric probe.
(2) learn to associate this image with an already established emotion of fear.
(3) learn to associate a contact with this image with an already established emotion of pain
(4) learn to remember the association in (3)
(5) learn to associate the memory in (4) with (2), so fear becomes associated with the possibility of a painful contact with the probe.

Steps 2-5 hinge on the prior evolution of the very ambitious step (1). However, step (1) refers to the addition of visual awareness to photon detection, and this by itself serves no evolutionary purpose if it does not include step (5). Therefore, although the five steps taken together might provide an additional evolutionary advantage to the creature, their occurring simultaneously, as a single step, would require a miracle. The wonderfish scenario is therefore improbable.

Anchors

We can overcome the above difficulty by increasing the number of subjective states that can have a direct impact on probability amplitudes. I call these states anchors. Pain is an anchor. It ties painful experience to an appropriate occasion for pain in the objective world. Fear is another anchor. An anchor is an experience that has an intrinsic motivational direction, thereby having a definite positive or negative effect on the probability amplitude of the component of the quantum superposition in which it occurs. Natural selection then chooses the influences that are appropriate to the survival of the species. This is how a reliable psycho-physical parallelism is established. Without anchors that can affect points of positive or negative interactive feedback between quantum mechanical and psychological states, a parallelism would be impossible.

Not all conscious experiences are anchors. Memory is not an anchor, and association is not an anchor. These must be introduced as single step expansions of consciousness around established anchors if they are to be a part of the psycho-physical parallelism.

Other Anchors

Hunger is a believable anchor inasmuch as it has an intrinsic motivational authority. It is a conscious experience that we imagine has a negative effect on the probability amplitude of states of 'creature inaction', at a time when the creature needs to be actively looking for food. Taste is another possible anchor that provides intrinsic motivation. It can have either a positive or negative polarity. It is assumed to have a positive influence on the probability amplitude of eating behavior when the organism benefits from the food in question, and a negative influence when the food is harmful. As with all of the polarities established by anchors, a wrong association (i.e., coupling a positive influence with harmful food) will threaten the survival of the species; so again, natural selection pairs appropriate subjective states with physical states of the organism. Smell is still another experience that can qualify as an anchor, for it also has definite positive and negative motivating qualities.

Perceptions such as sight, sound, and touch are not intrinsically motivating in a positive or negative direction. Unlike taste or smell, there is nothing inherently provocative about, say, 'white light' that would prompt an instinctive yes or no reaction. This means that a creature must learn context dependent responses to white light. More generally, it must learn context dependent responses to anything that is seen, heard, or touched**. It follows that primitive sight, sound, and touch perceptions cannot be anchor experiences. They require contextual interpretations that are too sophisticated for elementary states of consciousness. Images with visual, auditory, and tactual dimensions must be formed in conjunction with established anchors if they are to be a part of the psycho-physical parallelism.

Another Scenario

 There are now six prospective anchor experiences: pleasure, pain, fear, hunger, taste, and smell, where each is capable of being established in a single step in the evolution of the species.  There is quite a large gap between pain and fear as we have seen, but there is not a large gap between hunger, taste, and smell.  So we can imagine an evolutionary scenario that begins with just these three.

 Since the hunger for food and the smell of food very often occur simultaneously, it is likely that they will come to reinforce one another.  If hunger represses inactive behavior, and if the right smell enhances active hunting behavior, then the two together should provide a powerful conscious incentive to hunt.  This kind of conscious association of one with the other requires only one evolutionary step.  As stated before, association is not itself an anchor experience, but it can become part of a developing psycho-physical parallelism as a result of an intimate relationship of hunger to smell.

  Similarly, good smell and good taste might become associated with each other at the time of the kill.  Couple this with a fading of aversive hunger, and the combination is a compelling conscious experience.  Another evolutionary step will then cement this association.

 Fear and smell consciousness might be aroused simultaneously in the presence of a predator.  The association of one with the other would require only a single evolutionary step, and that would bring fear into the established cluster.  Pleasure might make a connection to the cluster through taste, and possibly through smell.

Hunger, taste, smell, fear, and pleasure therefore provide a cluster of anchors around which other anchors and other elements of consciousness can become attached. It is entirely possible that the construction of visual, auditory, and tactual images like wonderfish’s step (1) will first take place around this cluster of conscious experiences. If while hunting and feeding the creature begins to have new experiences identifiable as sights, sounds, or touches, and if these are associated with the predators, prey, and other objects in the creature’s environment, and if this association reinforces the anchor experiences within the cluster that directly influence behavior, then these new found experiences should support the survival of the species. As visual, acoustic, and tactual experiences become more and more sophisticated, they will allow the construction of images of the external world that are in accord with the psycho-physical parallelism. This construction does not have to be a single step in evolution. It could very well be a gradual process that is motivated at every point by the established conscious cluster. The above wonderfish scenario is therefore replaced by a process that puts step (1) last, rather than first.

Oddly enough, pain does not seem to associate directly with any of the other five anchors. It remains an independent anchor that has great potency, characteristics that recommended its use in refs. 2, 3. For this reason, it is entirely possible that pain consciousness was not integrated into the main cluster until sufficient subjective imagery was established. The creature might then have learned to associate the onset of pain with certain tactical images, auditory images, or visual images (e.g., the electric probe). But however pain becomes connected to the main cluster, it will certainly provide those established visual, auditory, and tactual images with another powerful anchor, giving them further legitimacy in the psycho-physical parallelism.

Other scenarios are possible that are centered on sex and/or mothering, both of which provide strongly positive motivations. Indeed, any clearly directional instinct or emotion has the potential to become an experiential anchor; and any anchor or group of anchors has the potential to become a cluster of consciousness that can tie down other (non-anchor) subjective elements and images to the physical world.

Anchor/Image Interdependence

The emerging pattern suggests that instincts or emotions are anchors, and that conscious constructions (images and ideas) are not anchors. Since, according to the above hypothesis, only anchors can directly affect an interaction between mind and matter, it follows that our subjective life can only be a valid psycho-physical parallelism to the extent that it is tied to instincts and emotions. That is probably true. It is also suggested that anchors are in no way dependent on images. That may not always be true. Consider anger consciousness!

Anger is another possible anchor experience that enhances aggressive behavior. It’s a different kind of aggression than that associated with hunger, because it has to do with defending turf or fighting for dominance within a herd. It can therefore appear as a separate emotion, emerging from a separate evolutionary step, giving us a total of seven independent anchors.

However, there is a curious interdependence between anger and fear that is reflected in the body’s fight or flight mechanism. Physiologically, it is very difficult to tell the difference between fight arousal and flight arousal. The difference seems to lie in what we might call ‘cortical’ processes. The creature must evaluate a situation and decide whether it is best to make a stand, or quit the field. It must decide if it should give in to its fear, or get angry. This is a matter of deciding which anchor to engage, and hence, which behavior to enhance. The implication is that the images that are created in conjunction with established anchors can subsequently be used to evaluate an objective situation, and then decide in favor of one anchor or another. More evolved species will surely display an anchor/image interdependence of this kind; and this will no doubt reinforce their subjective imagery to the reality demands of the psycho-physical parallelism.

Footnotes

*Department of Physics and Astronomy, State University of New York, Stony Brook, N. Y. 11794-3800 http://nuclear.physics.sunysb.edu/~mould
**It is true that a species can acquire a genetic response to certain complex visual experiences, like the classic image of a snake in the grass.  But I assume that this happens at a more advance evolutionary level than is being considered here.

References

¹ R Mould, Found Physics, 25(11), p. 1621 (1995)
² R Mould, Found Physics, 28(11), p. 1703 (1998)
³ R Mould, Found Physics, 29(12), p. 1951 (1999)
⁴ R Mould, "Consciousness and Endogenous State Reduction: Two Experiments",  see author's home page.
⁵ J von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, (1955) p.351