The Comparative Dynamics of Party Support
in Great Britain
(With Everett Young,
Forthcoming at the Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties)
Abstract: Political leadership has long been established as a
key determinant of party support. Yet, the extent to which this may
vary across parties in and out of government is less well understood.
In fact, there are good reasons to expect leadership to matter less
for “protest” parties. We demonstrate that the relationship between
satisfaction with the Liberal Democratic leader and support for the
British Liberal Democratic Party is fundamentally different than
those between the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition
and their respective parties. Using 28 years of monthly public
opinion data, we develop models of the political and economic
factors that determine support for each of the three major parties
in Britain in each of the 1979-1997 and 1997-2006 periods. We find
that vote intentions for the two major parties are closely related
with the satisfaction levels of their respective leaders but that
this relationship is substantially weaker for the Liberal Democrats
under the period of Tory rule and non-existent for the years of
Labour rule. These findings are in contrast to individual-level
studies that have shown the importance of leadership approval to
vote choice for all British parties. More generally, we show the
need to refine theories about the relationships between parties and
their leaders.
Dynamic Conditional Correlations in
Political Science
(With Janet M. Box Steffensmeier,
Forthcoming at the American
Journal of Political Science)
Abstract:
Time-varying relationships and volatility are two methodological
challenges that are particular to the field of time series. In the
case of the former, more comprehensive understanding can emerge when
we ask under what circumstances relationships may change. The impact
of context—such as the political environment, the state of the
economy, the international situation, etc.—is often missing in
dynamic analyses that estimate time invariant parameters. In
addition, time-varying volatility presents a number of challenges
including threats to inference if left unchecked. Among time-varying
parameter models, the Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) model is
a creative and useful approach that deals effectively with over-time
variation in both the mean and variance of time series. The DCC
model allows us to study the evolution of relationships over time in
a multivariate setting by relaxing model assumptions and offers
researchers a chance to reinvigorate understandings that are tested
using time series data. We demonstrate the method’s potential in the
first example by showing how the importance of subjective
evaluations of the economy are not constant, but vary considerably
over time as predictors of presidential approval. A second example
using international dyadic time series data shows that the story of
movement and comovement is incomplete without an understandin of the
dynamics of their variance as well as their means.
Approval Data (xls)
Levant Data
(xls)
RATS program
Forecasting Non-Incumbent Presidential Elections: Lessons Learned
from the 2000 Election
(With
Andrew Sidman and Maxwell Mak, Forthcoming at the International
Journal of Forecasting)
Abstract: As the 2008 election approaches, we offer a
reexamination of the 2000 election—its place in history, political
science, and presidential forecasting models. This is especially
relevant since 2008, like 2000, will be another election without a
president seeking reelection. How should forecasting models deal
with such elections? Looking carefully at 2000 we evaluate the
utility of “weighting” candidates in non-incumbent elections. Using
Bayesian Model Averaging, we find that weighting helps to better
predict 2000, but also produces poorer model fit over a wider set of
elections. For other non-incumbent elections, weighting only
improves predictions for the 1960 election. Moreover, we find that
the 2000 election is anything but ordinary; attempts by forecasters
to change the specification of models to better fit the 2000
election are ultimately harmful to the forecasting exercise. We
conclude that presidential forecasts are best when they ignore
whether or not an incumbent is running.
The Aggregated Consequences of Motivated
Ignorance and the Dynamics of Partisan Presidential Approval
(With Daniel Cassino, Political
Psychology, 28(6), 719-746 2007)
Abstract: Research in political psychology has shown the importance of
motivated reasoning as a
prism through which individuals view the political world. From this
we develop the hypothesis
that, with strong positive beliefs firmly in place, partisan groups
ignore or discount
information about the performance of political figures they like. We
then speculate about
how this tendency should manifest itself in presidential approval
ratings and test our
hypotheses using monthly presidential approval data disaggregated by
party identification
for the 1955–2005 period. Our results show that partisan groups
generally do reward and
punish presidents for economic performance, but only those
presidents of the opposite
party. We also develop a model of presidential approval for
self-identified Independents
and, finally, a model of the partisan gap, the difference in
approval between Democrat and
Republican identifiers.
*Data File (.xls)
Data Dictionary
RATS
program
Strategic Party Government: Party Influence
in Congress, 1789-2000
(With
Adam McGlynn and
Greg Koger, American Journal of Political
Science, 2007, 51(3): 464-481)
Abstract: Why does the
influence of Congressional parties fluctuate over time? The prevailing
answer, conditional party government, holds that party influence
increases when legislators agree ideologically with fellow party
members and disagree with members of the opposing party. Under these
conditions, legislators delegate power to party leaders to achieve
desired policy goals. We propose an alternative model, Strategic
Party Government, which instead highlights the electoral
motives of legislative parties and the strategic interaction between
parties. We test this new theory using the entire range of House and
Senate party behavior from 1789 to 2000 and find that the strategic
behavior of parties dominates ideology as an explanation for variation
in party influence. Moreover, we find strong links between party
behavior in Congress and electoral outcomes. An increase in partisan
influence on legislative voting has adverse electoral costs, while
winning contested votes has electoral benefits.
*Appendix to paper
Reexamining the Growth of the Institutional
Presidency, 1940-2000
(With Matthew
J. Dickinson,
Journal of Politics, 2007, 69(1):
206-219)
Abstract:
Scholars differ regarding the reason for the
institutionalization of a large, functionally specialized White
House-centered presidential staff system during the last six decades.
Among the explanations cited are a general growth in government size
and complexity, an increase in the presidential workload, and the
institutional rivalry between the president and Congress. However,
using new advances in time series analysis based on fractional
integration, we show that these models of staff growth are plagued by
conceptual and methodological shortcomings that render their
substantive conclusions misleading. In response, we develop and test a
more comprehensive model of presidential staff institutionalization
that takes into account the different ways in which this process takes
place. Presidents institutionalize staff support, we conclude, to
better manage relations with Congress, the media and the public.
Government growth, policy complexity and presidential workload, on the
other hand, play a much smaller role in this process than previous
research indicates.
*Appendix to paper
The PM and the Pendulum: Dynamic Forecasting
of British Elections
(With Helmut
Norpoth, British
Journal of Political Science, 2007, 37(1): 71-87)
Abstract: We apply a
dynamic perspective to forecasting votes and seats in British
elections. Our vote model captures the swing of the electoral pendulum
between the two major parties while using prime ministerial approval as
the (sole) short-run predictor of vote choice. The seat model
incorporates the inertia of the previous seat distribution while
translating votes into seats. The models forecast the lead of one major
party over the other (percentage for votes and number for seats). The
statistical estimation includes data on British elections since 1945,
although the test for cycles (swing of the electoral pendulum) goes as
far back as 1832. The vote model picks the winner of every one of the
1945-2005 elections (out-of-sample forecasts) and is rarely off by more
than 2 percentage points. The seat model does almost as well, rarely
missing the seat lead by more than 25.
War President: The Approval Ratings of
George W. Bush
(With Richard Eichenberg and, Richard J. Stoll, Journal of Conflict Resolution,
2006, 50(6): 783-808)
Abstract:
The authors estimate a model of the job approval
ratings of President George W. Bush that includes fives sets of
variables: a "honeymoon" effect, an autoregressive function that tracks
a decline in approval, measures of economic performance, measures of
important "rally events," and a measure of the costs of war - in this
case, the U.S. death toll in the Iraq War. Several significant effects
are found, including the rally that followed the attcks of September
11, 2001; the commencement of the war in Iraq; and the capture of
Baghdad in April 2003. Since the begining of the war in Iraq, however,
the casualties of war have had a significant negative impact on Bush's
approval ratings. Although the effects of additional battle deaths in
Iraq will decrease approval only marginally, results suggest that there
is also little prospect for sustained improvement so long as casualties
continue to accumulate.
Election Cycles and the Economic Voter
(With Sean Carey, Political Research Quarterly,
2006, 59(4): 543-556)
Abstract: Many studies have sought to clarify how
voters’ opinions of the economy predict evaluations of
leaders and parties. Following Kramer’s (1983) work on the
problems of studying individual-level data, many authors have employed
aggregate data in dynamic analyses to estimate rival models and choose
favored variables. A restriction with such analyses is that they are
unable to look closely at different periods within the overall study
and thus may miss the importance of contextual factors. Our study
complements existing aggregate-level inferences by analyzing repeated
cross-sections of opinion polls in Britain over several years. We
estimate the effects of subjective economic variables on vote intention
in monthly public opinion surveys and examine how the parameters vary
across individuals and over time. We suggest that the choices of
whether voters are forward-looking, backward looking, egocentric or
sociotropic are overly restrictive. We find that the sociotropic
dimension dominates the egocentric dimension in evaluations of the
government and that the relative importance of prospective and
retrospective evaluations vary in predictable patterns over the
election cycle.
The Impact of Economic vs. Institutional
Factors in Elite Evaluations of Presidential Progress Toward Democracy
in Latin America
(With Benjamin
G. Bishin and
Robert
Barr, Comparative
Political Studies, 2006, 39(10): 1194-1219)
Abstract: Elites’
support for democracy and their satisfaction with political leadership
are important factors in evaluating Latin American leaders’
progress towards consolidating their democracies. However, we know
surprisingly little about how elites understand or define democracy and
thereby evaluate leaders in terms of their progress towards democracy.
Much of the literature on the opinions of elites is focused on their
relative interest in democratic values and formal institutions. But is
progress in these two areas really of utmost importance to elites? In
order to better understand elite views of democracy, we use new survey
data in which elites assess current politicians’ progress
towards democracy. We find that the importance of perceived progress in
democratic values – rights and liberties – and
formal institutions is minor compared to the impact of perceptions of
economic progress. That is, elite evaluations of democratic progress
depend primarily on their perceptions of economic success and only
secondarily on their perceptions of achievement of democratic values
like respect for civil rights and civil liberties.
Dynamic Foreign Policy Behavior
(With Will Moore, Journal of Conflict Resolution,
2003, 47(1): 13-32)
Abstract: How best to
classify event counts of directed dyadic foreign policy behavior and
howbest to model them are points of disagreement among researchers.
Should such series be modeled as unit roots
(“perfect” memory) or as stationary
(“short” memory)? It is demonstrated that the
dichotomous choice between unit root (I(1)) and level stationarity
(I(0)) is overly restrictive. The intermediate (and more general)
possibility of fractional integration (0 < I < 1), a
concept proven useful in studies of aggregate opinion, is applied.
Results showthat fractional integration is extremely common and that
error correction mechanisms (ECMs) can still be appropriate in the
absence of unit-root series. Fractional ECMs are used in
action–reaction models of bilateral relationships to
demonstrate this. Given the frequency of fractional integration, its
flexibility, and the problems encountered when ignoring it, scholars
should incorporate fractional integration techniques into their models.
Data
& Programs
Fractional (Co)integration and Governing
Party Support in Britain
(With Harold D.
Clarke, British
Journal of Political Science, 2003, 33(2): 283-301)
Abstract:
Recent developments in the analysis of long-memoried processes provide
important leverage for analysing time-series variables of interest to
political scientists. This article provides an accessible exposition of
these methods and illustrates their utility for addressing protracted
controversies regarding the political economy of party support in
Britain. Estimates of the fractionally differencing parameter, d,
reveal that governing party support, prime ministerial approval and
economic evaluations are long-memoried and non-stationary, and that
governing party support and prime ministerial approval are fractionally
cointegrated. Pace conventional wisdom that party leader images matter
little, if at all, analyses of multivariate fractional error correction
models show that prime ministerial approval has important short-run and
long-run effects on party support. Prospective and retrospective
personal economic evaluations are influential but, contrary to a
longstanding claim, national economic evaluations are not significant.
The article concludes by suggesting that individual-level heterogeneity
is a likely source of the observed aggregate-level fractional
integration in governing party support and its determinants. Specifying
parsimonious models that incorporate theoretically meaningful
heterogeneity is a challenging topic for future research.
Modelling Memory and Volatility: Recent
Advances in the Analysis of Political Time Series
(With Harold D.
Clarke, Electoral
Studies, 2000, 19(1): 1-7)
You Must Remember This: Dealing with Long
Memory in Political Analyses
(With Robert W.
Walker and Harold D.
Clarke,
2000, Electoral Studies, 2000, 19: 31-48)
Abstract: Recent
research by Box-Steffensmeier and Smith (Box-Steffensmeier, J.M.,
Smith, R.M., 1996. The dynamics of aggregate partisanship. American
Political Science Review 90, 567–580; Box-Steffensmeier,
J.M., Smith, R.M., 1998. Investigating political dynamics using
fractional integration methods. American Journal of Political Science
42, 661–689) has alerted scholars to the problems involved in
the analysis of fractionally integrated time series. This paper pursues
this line of inquiry by compiling evidence on the time series
properties of a number of common variables used in political research,
including macropartisanship, presidential approval, the monthly and
quarterly index of consumer sentiment, percentage liberalism in Supreme
Court decision making, and others. In applying a variety of formal
tests to these series, we fail to reject hypotheses of random walk or
fractionally integrated processes while commonly rejecting hypotheses
of stationary behavior. Evidence obtained from point estimates of the
fractional differencing parameter, d, supports these findings while
providing a glimpse into the long-memory characteristics of many
political time series. Finally, Monte Carlo studies are performed that
demonstrate the likelihood of spurious regressions when researchers
fail to account for the fractional dynamics of time series.
Divided Government, United Approval: the Dynamics of Congressional
and Presidential Approval
(Forthcoming
at Congress and the Presidency. Accepted 11/07.)
Abstract: A theory of partisan control might
expect that during times of divided government, approval of one
Congress and the Presidency would move in opposite directions. Yet,
the Congressional approval question is an ambiguous one in the minds
of voters and makes understanding the movement of the aggregated
series much more difficult. Here, monthly Congressional and
Presidential approval data for the 1995-2005 period are studied and
found to move in tandem, even during periods of divided government.
Multivariate ARFIMA Models show a strong and positive relationship
between Congressional approval and lagged Presidential approval,
even during the period of fiercely divided government under
President Clinton. This means that, rather than paying attention to
partisan control, the electorate transfers feelings about the
president to the institution of Congress.
The Electoral Consequences of Party Loyalty
in Congress
(With Jamie L. Carson and
Gregory Koger,
Under review at the American Political Science Review)
Abstract:
To what extent is party loyalty a liability for incumbent legislators? Past
research on legislative voting and elections suggests that voters
punish members who are ideologically “out of step” with their
districts. In seeking to move beyond the emphasis in the literature
on the effects of ideological extremity on legislative vote share,
we examine how partisan loyalty can adversely affect legislator’s
electoral fortunes. Specifically, we estimate the effects of each
legislator’s party unity—the tendency of a member to vote with his
or her party on issues that divide the two major parties—on vote
margin when running for reelection. Our results suggest that party
loyalty can indeed be a liability for incumbent House members. In
fact, we find that voters are not punishing elected representatives
for being too ideological, they are punishing them for being
too partisan.
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