Brandon Bartels

Some Insights from Political Science on Political Issues

The Conflicting Nature of the Supreme Court’s Bush v. Gore Decision

“Myth sustains mystique, which shelters an institution from the public eye and permits it to manipulate people. But if the mask of myth falls, people can see more clearly what is going on. If an institution's involvement in raw political decision-making processes becomes visible, people may develop contempt for it. In contrast, invisibility and distance from the mass public sustain myth and thus legitimacy.”

- Gregory Casey, 1974.
From “The Supreme Court and Myth,” Law and Society Review 8: 385-419.

“Are we so highly political, after all? We've surely done other things, too, that were activist, but here we're applying the Equal Protection Clause in a way that would de-legitimize virtually every election in American history.”

- Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 2001.
From The Accidental President, by David Kaplan.

“[T]he Supreme Court decision in Bush v. Gore did not have a debilitating impact on the legitimacy of the US Supreme Court. Perhaps because the Court enjoyed such a deep reservoir of good will, most Americans were predisposed to view the Court’s involvement as appropriate, and therefore dissatisfaction with the outcome did not poison attitudes towards the institution.”

 

- James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira, and Lester K. Spence, 2003 (p. 555).
From “The Supreme Court and the US Presidential Election of 2000,” British Journal of Political Science 33:535-56.


Supreme Court Decision-Making

The Attitudinal Model

“The Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the justices. Simply put, Rehnquist votes the way he does because he is extremely conservative; Marshall voted the way he did because he is extremely liberal.”

 

                                                - Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, 1993 (p. 65)

                                                From The Supreme Court and Attitudinal Model. New York: Cambridge University Press.

 

Constraints on Judicial Policymaking? The Founder of Judicial Behavior Weighs In

“Political scientists who have done so much to put the ‘political’ in ‘political jurisprudence’ need to emphasize that it is still ‘jurisprudence.’ It is judging in a political context, but it is still judging; and judging is something different from legislating or administering. Judges make choices, but they are not the ‘free’ choices of congressmen…. Any accurate analysis of judicial behavior must have as a major purpose a full clarification of the unique limiting conditions under which judicial policy making proceeds.

                                   

                                                - C. Herman Pritchett, 1969 (p. 42)

                                                From “The Development of Judicial Research.” In Frontiers of Judicial Research, eds. Joel B. Grossman and Joseph Tanenhaus. New York: John

Wiley and Sons.

 

Multiple Goals?

“For the Supreme Court, many scholars have dealt with goal complexity by positing a single dominant goal. The assumption that justices act solely on the basis of their policy goals has advanced our understanding of the Court a good deal…. Yet continued reliance on this assumption carries costs. Most important, it rules out consideration of motivations other than the advancement of policy goals. If those motivations are essentially irrelevant to Supreme Court justices, this is not a problem. But if goals other than policy motivate justices in significant ways, as I think they do, then the model of single-minded justices banishes from analysis much of what is most interesting about the Court. How do justices balance competing goals against each other? What conditions affect the relative weight of various goals?”

 

                                                - Lawrence Baum, 1994 (p. 761)

                                                From “What Judges Want: Judges’ Goals and Judicial Behavior.” Political Research Quarterly 47:749-68.

 

Judicial Minimalism

“The analytical heart of the current [Rehnquist] Court [Justices Ginsburg, Souter, O’Connor, Breyer, and Kennedy] has adopted no unitary ‘theory’ of constitutional interpretation. Instead of adopting theories, they decide cases…. In their different ways, each of these Justices tends to be minimalist…. [They] seek to avoid broad rules and abstract theories, and attempt to focus their attention only on what is necessary to resolve particular disputes. Minimalists do not like to work deductively; they do not see outcomes as reflecting rules or theories laid down in advance. They pay close attention to the particulars of individual cases. They also tend to think analogically and by close reference to the actual and hypothetical problems.”

 

                                                - Cass R. Sunstein, 1999 (p. 9)

                                                From One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.


On Public Opinion and Citizen Sophistication

The Dilemma

“The typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field. He argues and analyzes in a way which he would readily recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real interests. He becomes a primitive again. His thinking is associative and affective…. This may prove fatal to the nation.”

 

                                                - Joseph Schumpeter, 1942 (p. 262)

                                                From Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper.

 

The Black-and-White Model

 “There is first a ‘hard core’ of opinion on a given issue, which is well crystallized and perfectly stable over time. For the remainder of the population, response sequences over time are statistically random…. Large portions of an electorate do not have meaningful beliefs, even on issues that have formed the basis for intense political controversy among elites for substantial periods of time.”

 

                                                - Philip E. Converse, 1964 (p. 242, 245)
                                               
From “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics.” In Ideology and Discontent, ed. David Apter.

 

The Ambivalence Perspective

“Response variation is rooted in an important substantive phenomenon, namely the common existence of ambivalence in people’s reactions to issues…. Even when people are temporally unstable, expressing completely opposing positions at different times, they may still…be expressing real feelings, in the sense that they are responding to the issue as they see it at the moment of response. Although the perceptions of the issue may change over time, the responses they generate are not, for that reason, lacking in authenticity.”

 

                                                - John R. Zaller, 1992 (p. 75, 94)

                                                From The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. New York: Cambridge University Press.

 

Top-Down, Value-Driven Models of Attitude Constraint

“[People possess] an integrated belief system which should permit them to link abstract principles to specific applications…. Although it may be true that most individuals do not exhibit perfect consistency from one concrete issue to the next, it is likely that most members of the mass public are capable of deducing logical issue positions from more abstract beliefs. Thus, when parties or candidates talk of the need to treat the disadvantaged more humanely and compassionately and deduce that more lenient welfare policies are, consequently, preferable, our data show that many individuals are fully capable of understanding the logical argument which is being offered.”

 

                                                - Mark A. Peffley and Jon Hurwitz 1985 (pp. 885-86)

                                                From “A Hierarchical Model of Attitude Constraint.” American Journal of Political Science 29:871-90.

 

The Heuristics School

“Citizens frequently can compensate for their limited information about politics by taking advantage of judgmental heuristics. Heuristics are judgmental shortcuts, efficient ways to organize and simplify political choices, efficient in the double sense of requiring relatively little information to execute, yet yielding dependable answers even to complex problems of choice…. Insofar as they can be brought into play, people can be knowledgeable in their reasoning about political choices without necessarily possessing a large body of knowledge about politics.”

 

                                                - Paul M. Sniderman, Richard A. Brody, and Philip E. Tetlock, 1991 (p. 19)

                                                From Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press.

 

“If we believe that well-informed voters make the best possible decisions, then the fact that relatively uninformed voters can emulate them suggests that the availability of certain types of information cues allows voters to use their limited resources efficiently while influencing electoral outcomes in ways that they would have if they had taken the time and effort necessary to acquire encyclopedic information.”

 

                                                - Arthur Lupia, 1994 (p. 72)

                                                From “Shortcuts versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections.” American Political Science

Review 88:63-76.

 

“People often have only incomplete information. Fortunately, reasoned choice does not require complete information. Instead, it requires knowledge: the ability to predict the consequences of actions.”

 

                                                - Arthur Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins, 1998 (p. 6)

                                                From The Democratic Dilemma. New York: Cambridge University Press.

 

Problems with Heuristics

“In the very process of communicating information to citizens, esteemed leaders may sometimes (and perhaps unwittingly) exacerbate an already pervasive problem of mass publics: chronic mental laziness. For some people, what should be the absorption and use of two relevant pieces of information—who conveys the message and the content of the message itself—stops with the messenger. Thus, when asked to recall the message even after a brief interlude, these individuals cannot.”

 

                                                - James H. Kuklinski and Normal L. Hurley, 1994 (p. 748)

                                                From “On Hearing and Interpreting Political Messages: A Cautionary Tale of Citizen Cue-Taking.” Journal of Politics 56;729-51.


What do people want from government?

"It often seems as though the demands made by the public are unrealistic. Citizens decry pork-barrel politics in general but are delighted when their own representative is successful in playing the game. They hate negative campaigning but are taken in by it. They complain because politicians do not listen to them and in practically the same breath complain that politicians are captives of polls and lack the backbone required to demonstrate true leadership. People become angry with politicians for not balancing the budget but do not want to pay the price in higher taxes, reduced services, or both, to do so. If people would take their citizen responsibilities seriously and be reasonable, according to this view, then many of the problems facing the nation today could more readily be solved by politicians who, after all, are supposed to be responsive to public desires."

- John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, 1995 (p. 11).
From Congress as Public Enemy. Cambridge University Press.

“The last thing people want is to be more involved in political decision making; they do not want to provide much input to those who are assigned to make these decisions; and they would rather not know all the details of the decision-making process. Most people have strong feelings on few if any of the issues the government needs to address and would much prefer to spend their time in nonpolitical pursuits.”

- John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, 2001 (p. 1-2)
From Stealth Democracy. Cambridge University Press.


 

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