Recent Manuscripts
The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of
War
Abstract:
According to a leading rationalist explanation, war can break out when a
large rapid shift of power renders unbelievable a rising states promise to
compensate its declining opponent, causing the latter to attack preventively.
This mechanism does not provide a complete and coherent explanation of war
because it does not specify how inefficient fighting resolves this commitment
problem. We present a complete information model of war as a sequence of
battles and show that although opportunities for a negotiated settlement
arise throughout, the very desirability of peace creates a commitment
problem that undermines its likelihood. Because players have incentives to
settle as soon as possible, they cannot credibly threaten to fight long
enough if an opponent launches a surprise attack. This decreases the
expected duration and costs of war and causes mutual deterrence to fail.
Fightings sheer destruction improves the credibility of these threats by
decreasing the benefits from continuing the war. Equilibrium fighting may
involve escalating costs that exceed the value of the stakes by the time
peace is negotiated and that leave both players worse off than when the
war began.
War and Incomplete Information
Abstract:
It has long been argued that incomplete information can be a cause of war
between more-or-less rationally led states. Fearon (1995) and Powell
(1999) formalize this idea and show that a risk-return tradeoff emerges
under private information, whereby a state may trade or a positive risk of
war to try to get a better deal at the negotiating table. We generalize
Powell's canonical model of crisis bargaining in the shadow of power, and
find that although risk-return equilibria exist, so do "non-risk"
equilibria in which the probability of war is zero. The results suggest
that private information by itself often merely leads to delay in reaching
a preferred-to-war negotiated settlement, and if inefficient war occurs
before then, it is only because the dissatised state is sufficiently
impatient. The results significantly enhance our understanding of one of the
canonical "rationalist explanations for war."
Pre-Negotiation Public Commitment in
Domestic and
International Bargaining
Abstract:
We use a formal bargaining model to examine why, in many domestic and
international bargaining situations, one or both negotiators make public statements
in front of their constituents committing themselves to obtaining certain benefits in
the negotiations. We find that making public commitments provides bargaining
leverage, when backing down from such commitments carries domestic political costs.
However, when the two negotiators face fairly similar costs for violating a public
commitment, a prisoner's dilemma is created in which both sides make high public
demands which can not both be satisfied, and both negotiators would be better off if
they could commit to not making public demands. However, making a public demand
is a dominant strategy for each negotiator, and this leads to a suboptimal outcome.
Escaping this prisoner's dilemma provides a rationale for secret negotiations.
Testable hypotheses are derived on the nature of the commitments and agreements
made in equilibrium.
Technical Supplement for
"Pre-Negotiation
Public Commitment in Domestic and International Bargaining"
Social Mobility and Political Transitions
Abstract:
I address the role of social mobility in political transitions.
I develop a political economy model of regime transitions that incorporates
social mobility as a key feature of the economy capturing the political attitudes
toward redistribution. I show that social mobility facilitates democratization by reducing
the conflict over redistribution between the rich and the poor. Furthermore, it facilitates
democratic consolidation by reducing the likelihood of a coup under democracy. On the other hand,
social mobility helps to keep an authoritarian regime stable by reducing the likelihood of mass
movements against political elites.
Social Mobility, Middle Class and Political Transitions
Abstract:
I address the puzzling behavior of the middle class during political transitions.
I develop a formal model of political transitions and incorporate social mobility
as a key feature of the economy capturing the political attitudes toward redistribution.
I show that political decisions depend, among other things, on social mobility; and
the ruling class, facing similar economic conditions yet different rates of mobility,
can make very different choices with respect to regime type. In particular, if the middle
class expected their children to keep their middle class status, then they would keep
semi-democracy or even allow a coup from above so that their children would enjoy lower
redistribution rates. Otherwise, the middle class would enfranchise the lower class, so that
their children would enjoy higher redistribution rates under democracy.
Minorities and Democratization
Abstract:
We analyze the effect on democratization of coalition formation among
groups that are divided along ethnic as well as economic lines. We show
that (i) the presence of ethnic minorities, in general, makes peaceful
democratic transitions less likely; (ii) minorities suffer from
discrimination policies less in democracies with intermediate levels of
income inequality; and (iii) minorities can be incorporated into the
political process in three ways: being part of a ruling coalition in
autocracy, joining majority factions in a revolutionary movement, or being
part of a ruling coalition in democracy. Interestingly, minority policy
gains and participation do not perfectly overlap: incorporation does not
necessarily imply less discrimination, and minorities can gain higher
utility even in discriminatory regimes.